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LEGISLATION
Congress Assails Industrial Thuggery
With the passage of the Byrnes Act,' making the interstate transportation
of strikebreakers a felony, Congress has at last taken a belated 2 and uncertain 8
step professedly directed toward the elimination of a national institution which
has for roughly half a century made the United States unique as the one civilized
nation of the Western world wherein private armies of mercenaries may roam
the land spreading violence and bloodshed at the behest of individual citizens. 4
For the use of professional strikebreakers and strike guards has brought about
in this country what has well been termed "an irresponsible extra-legal form of
warfare." 5
Conditions Giving Rise to the Act
It is beyond cavil that the use of professional strong-arm men by employers
has invariably been a direct provocation of violence in labor disputes., There
should be little wonder that the very sight of these imported thugs is usually
enough to infuriate a group of striking employees, for they are customarily drawn
from the very lowest elements of society, from the underworld gangs of the big
cities and their hangers-on, many of these so-called detectives having police
records of the worst kind.7  While there have undeniably been glaring instances
of violence by strikers as well as by their opponents," still the predominantly
I. Pub. L. No. 776, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 24, 1936), 18 U. S. C. A. § 4o7a (Supp.
1936) : "Whoever shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or abet in
transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, any person with intent to employ such person
to obstruct or interfere, in any manner, with the right of peaceful picketing during any labor
controversy affecting wages, hours, or conditions of labor, or the right of organization for
the purpose of collective bargaining, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and shall be punish-
able by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in
the discretion of the court."
2. Over twenty years ago sweeping recommendations were made to Congress for the
enactment of measures that would probably have wiped out professional strikebrealdng as a
national business. See FINAL REPORT OF U. S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
(1915) 152. Congress failed to act, however.
3. See infra pp. 411-413.
4. See HUNTER, VIOLENCE AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT (1914) 280-281; FINAL REPORT
OF U. S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1915) 142.
5. See FITCH, CAUSES OF INDUSTRIAL UNREST (1924) 258. The public at large, how-
ever, would probably be startled to learn of these semi-anarchical conditions in industrial
relations, for private detectives and strike guards are still apt to be generally regarded as
wholly admirable, if not downright romantic characters. See HUNTER, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 282.
6. See H. R. REP. No. 2431, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) I; SEN. REP. No. 142o, 74th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) I; Hearings before Subcommittee No. r of Committee on Judiciary of
House of Representatives on S. 2039, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 2 (statement of Senator
James F. Byrnes).
For example, the bloody Homestead strike in 1892 was set off when the Carnegie Steel
Company ordered the Pinkerton detective agency to send to Homestead 300 men armed with
Winchester rifles.
7. See Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Education and Labor
Pursuant to S. Res. 266, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 130, 333-342; HUNTER, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 284-288. For a detailed history of the strikebreaking business in the United States
see LEVINSoN, I BREAK STRIKES (1935), especially pp. 105-118, 257-265, for the criminal
character of the operatives thus employed. A more romantic point of view regarding his
chosen profession is presented by the founder of the nation's longest established dynasty of
strikebreakers in PINKERTON, STRIKERS, COMMUNISTS, TRAMPS AND DETECTIVES (1878).
8. At Herrin, Illinois, in 1923, a mob of strikers and strike sympathizers beat to death
with clubs twenty-one unarmed strikebreakers. See REPORT OF U. S. CoAL COMfMISSION ON
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE COAL FIELDS, SEN. Doc. No. 195, 68th Cong., ist Sess. (1925) Part
I, 164-168.
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criminal character of the men hired as strikebreakers and guards stands out
clearly.0 Moreover, the double-dealing of the detective agencies which supply
them always tends to create or protract turbulence and disorder.,10
In spite of the highly unsavory character of the industrial detective agencies
and their operatives, their use by employers of labor is apparently wholly reputa-
ble and is so widespread as to amount to a national industry operating on a large
scale. 1 In view of the notorious rascality of labor spies and strikebreakers, it
On the other hand, in the Ludlow massacre, during the Colorado coal strike of 1913-1914,
thirteen women and children and six strikers were shot down and killed by company guards
and militiamen. See WEST, REPORT ON THE COLORADO STRIKE (U. S. Commission on Indus-
trial Relations, 1915) 124-138.
9. See Gleason, Industrial Democracy and Gunmen (iga2) 25 NEW REPuBLIc 318;
Owens, Gunmen in West Virginia (1921) 28 NEW REPUBLIC 90. For some representative
criminal deeds committed by guards and detectives in the course of strikebreaking work, see
State v. Newman, 127 Minn. 445, 149 N. W. 945 (1914) (mine guards convicted of kidnaping
leader of striking miners) ; State v. Meese, 200 Wis. 454, 225 N. W. 746 (1929) (bombing by
guard furnished by detective agency) ; Ericson, Good Men and True (1929) 6o NEw REPtu-
LIC 292 (union miner beaten to death by three Pennsylvania coal and iron policemen) ; Phila-
delphia Inquirer, Feb. 16, 1915, p. I (guards convicted of manslaughter) ; United Mine Work-
ers Journal, Aug. I, 1920 (detective convicted of murder of union member) ; A. F. of L.
Weekly News Service, Sept. 2, 1929 (detective convicted of attempt to bribe union organizer).
io. It is a common practice of the industrial detective agencies to insure the prolongation
of their employment by having their spies, after insinuating themselves into the confidences of
the labor unions, incite strikes and advocate violence by the union members. See Wood Mow-
ing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 192-195, 186 N. Y. Supp. 95, 100-101
(Sup. Ct. 1921) ; Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S.
x482, 7oth Cong., Ist Sess. (1928) 129-130, 236, 278, 543, 564; HOWARD, THE LABOR SPY
(1924) 178-197.
And after the actual commencement of a strike, violence and rioting are usually instigated
by the thugs hired as strikebreakers, and not by the strikers. For example, in the Pullman
strike of 1894 the strikers detailed 300 of their number to guard the property of the Pullman
Company, much of which was wrecked or burned by the very persons who had been engaged
as "detectives" and deputy marshals. It is ever true that the employer has everything to gain
by encouraging violence after a strike has begun, since the result is always likely to be direct
suppression of the striking element by the forces of organized government, or at the very
least, the marshalling of public opinion against the strikers. On the other hand, the strikers
have everything to lose by rioting and fighting, and in fact the union leaders usually go out
of their way to avoid any violent display or destruction of property. See HUNTER, op. cit.
supra note 4, 300-319. Judge Amidon took this point of view in Great Northern Ry. v.
Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414, 418 (D. N. D. I923). See also Hearings before Subcommittee of
Senate Committee on Education and Labor Pursuant to S. Res. 266, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936) 120.
ii. For example, in 1920 the notorious Bergoff Service Bureau is reputed to have sup-
plied the Erie Railroad with 6ooo strikebreakers at a cost of $2,oooooo. In igi6 the same
agency did a million-dollar strikebreaking job for the Interborough Rapid Transit Company.
See Basso, Strike-Buster: Man Among Mein (1934) 81 NEw REPuBLic 124. In the railroad
shop strike of 1922, 53,831 strike guards were hired by 5o railroads. See United States v.
Railway Employees' Dep't of A. F. of L., 29o Fed. 978, 981 (N. D. Ill. 1923). Of 187 licensed
detective agencies in New York, 55 solicit strikebreaking work. See Levinson, Strikebreak-
ing Incorporated (1935) 171 HARPER's 719, 724.
In some industries combinations of employers perform for themselves many of the serv-
ices that the detective agencies furnish to other employers, importing strikebreakers and
guards when local men cannot be obtained. E. g., the Stove Founders' National Defense
Association; the National Founders' Association; the National Metal Trades Association;
the National Erectors' Association; the United Typothetae of America. See BONNETT, Em-
PLOYERS AssocIATIoNs IN THE UNITED STATES (1922) 46, 75-76, 109-II0, 143, 246; WATKINS,
LABOR PROBLEMS (1929) 567-572.
The whole system seems to be a peculiarly American one. Of the few private detective
agencies in England and continental Europe, none engages in industrial work. See WITTE,
THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932) 183. However, the "Free Labor movement"
in England is maintained to supply strikebreakers and to protect them, as well as to lobby
against unions. See CoLLisoN, THE APOSTLE or FREE LABOR (1913) 94.
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has been suggested that the only theory on which the pouring forth of huge sums
annually to these agencies can be explained is that the employers are possessed
by an unreasoning belief that the membership of labor unions is predominantly
and inherently criminal and that it takes a thief to catch a thief.
12
Previous attempts to hinder the nefarious operations of the Pinkertons, the
Bumses, the Bergoffs, and their ilk, whether in the form of state legislation,
municipal ordinances, or summary action by executive officers, have been almost
uniformly unsuccessful. The importation of persons to fill the places of the
striking employees, i. e., strikebreakers in the strict sense as distinguished from
strike guards, has always been relatively untrammeled by statutory restrictions,'
3
save for the requirement imposed by about one-fourth of the states that in adver-
tising for new employees during a strike the employer must notify the prospective
strikebreakers of the existence of a labor dispute.14 The courts of a number of
jurisdictions have upheld the constitutionality of this type of statute.'5
With regard to the use of armed guards, regulatory statutes of two general
types have been fairly popular with state legislatures 16 without unduly distressing
the strikebreaking agencies. The so-called "anti-Pinkerton laws" prohibit the
importation of armed guards from outside the state.' 7  But the state govern-
ments seem to regard the mere enactment of such laws as an all-sufficient gesture
and make no attempt to enforce them by bringing prosecutions thereunder,
The common practice of locally commissioning private guards as deputy sheriffs
or special police officers has also led some states to require certain qualifications
of citizenship and residence as prerequisites to being enlisted for police work. 9
12. See WITrE, op. cit. supra note ii, at 188.
13. For the first and most noteworthy published challenge of the right of employers to
import strikebreakers, see FINAL REPORT OF U. S. CommIssiON ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
(1915) 142-144, wherein it is suggested that the two traditional rights, of strikebreakers to
work and of employers to do business, are based upon misconceptions by the courts.
14. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, I93) Act 4728; CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's Mills,
1930) §§ 4479-448o; ME. Rv. STAT. (930) c. 54, §§ 7, 8; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 149,
§§ 22, 23; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) H 10392-10393; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. (1935)
§§ 11220-11222; NEV. Comp. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 2772-2774; N. H. PUB. LAWS (3926)
c. 176, §§ 36-39; OKLA. STAT. (93) §§ io879-I0880; ORE. CODE ANN. (3930) §§49-IooI,
49-1002; TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) §§ 11363-1'364; WIS. STAT. (1931) § 103.43.
In a few other states employment agencies are required to give notice of the presence of
strikes in plants calling on them for employees, though the employers are not so required.
E. g., OHIO ANN. CODE (Throckmorton, 1934) § 896-3 (d) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I931)
tit. 43, §§ 607-6o8 (also requires employer to inform employment agency) ; TEX. Come. STAT.
(1928) art. 5221. This seems to be a general practice of employment agencies, even inde-
pendently of statute. See WITTE, op. cit. supra note II, at 2o9, n. 3.
15. E. g., Comm. v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 356, io3 N. E. 923 (1914); Biersach & Nieder-
meyer Co. v. State, 177 Wis. 388, i88 N. W. 65o (1922). Contra: Josma v. Western Steel
Car & Foundry Co., 249 Ill. 5o8, 94 N. W. 945 (91).
16. See WIrrE, op. cit. supra note ii, at 2I.
17. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 2792-2793; COLO. ANN. STAT. (Court-
right's Mills, i93o) § 4481; Ky. CONST. § 225; Ky. STAT. (Baldwin's Carroll, 193o) § 1376;
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10501 (prohibits maintaining armed force for hire within
state); Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 4237; MONT. CONST., art. 3, § 31; MONT. REv. CODE ANN.
(1935) § 10925; NEB. COMP. STAT. (1929) § 28-725; OKLA. STAT. (193I) §io88I; S. C.
CONST., art. VIII, § 9; TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 11365; UTAH CONST., art. XII,
§ 16; Wis. STAT. (93i) § 348.472; Wyo. CONsT., art. XIX, § 6.
I8. See WIrE, op. cit. mupra note Ii, at 211. Probably any such attempt would prove
futile, since nearly all such statutes can be circumvented by transporting or hiring the guards
separately from any shipment of arms to be used by them.
i9. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) §§ 2790-2791; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill,
1933) c. 325, 111128, 9; Ky. STAT. (Baldwin's Carroll, 1930) § 1376; MAss. GEN. LAWS
(1932) c. 149, § 176; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) 84233; Nm. Comp. STAT. (1929) §28-726;
N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 393o) c. 41, § 1845; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. i8,
§ 871; TEX. CoMP. STAT. (1928) art. 5207; W. VA. CODE ANN. (932) § 6037; WIS. STAT.(i93y) §866.11 (1).
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There have also been efforts to regulate the agencies themselves, as well as
the individuals supplied by them, through the enactment of laws requiring private
detective agencies to have a state license.20  Inasmuch as most of the agencies
regularly operate on the outside edge of the law and are not bothered by legal
niceties in any event, the refusal or revocation of a license has consistently proved
to be a negligible deterrent.
2
1
The attempts of governors, mayors, and police chiefs to prevent, by executive
action, violence and destruction at the hands of imported gangsters have been, if
possible, even more ineffectual than legislative action.2 2 For efforts to keep out
or arrest strikebreakers have uniformly been blocked through the issuance of
injunctions by courts to whom that nebulous and once sacrosanct property right-
to conduct one's business as one sees fit 23Still seems important enough to
demand protection even at a sacrifice of the public peace and order.2 4  Similar
objections have of course been relied on to impugn the various ordinances and
statutes purporting to limit the right to employ strikebreakers and guards .2  In
addition, one case has indicated that a state has no power to restrict the importa-
tion of armed guards from another state, not only because to do so would violate
the privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment (by withholding from citizens of other states the right to keep and
bear arms given by the constitution of the home state) but also because it would
be an attempt to regulate interstate commerce and so an interference with the
exclusive power of Congress.
26
Constitutionality
This proposition at least suggests that the commerce power is broad enough
to sustain the validity of the Byrnes Act. And such a conclusion does seem
clear, unless by possibility the constitutional objections under the Fourteenth
Amendment which nullified local regulations of the right to use strikebreakers
and armed guards 2 7 prove sufficiently persuasive to cause the present measure
20. E. g., CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 2o7oa; MIcH. ComP. LAws (1929)
§§8715-8727; N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, I93O) C. 21, §§ 70-75; Wis. STAT. (931) §§ 175.07,
175.08 are representative of the common type.
21. For instance, Bergoff's most profitable years were those following the revocation of
his license in I916. At that time and again during revocation proceedings in 1935 Bergoff
boasted of his indifference to the matter of having or not having a license. See LEMINsoN,
op. cit. mtpra note 7, at 182, 298.
22. Id., at 191-193.
23. See Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 765, 53 AtI. 23o, 233 (Ch.
1902).
24. See American Steel & Wire Co. v. Davis, 261 Fed. 8oo (N. D. Ohio, igg) (injunc-
tion issued against mayor and police of Cleveland prohibiting the arrest and deportation by
police of strikebreakers imported to the city by complainant) ; Schenectady Ry. v. Whit-
myer, 121 Misc. 4, 199 N. Y. Supp. 827 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (injunction issued against mayor and
police of Schenectady who, to preserve law and order, had ordered the street car company not
to operate its cars during strike) ; Mullins Body Corp. v. Int. Ass'n of Mach., Local No. 568,
3 LAw AND LABOR I49 (N. D. Ohio, 1921) (mayor and police enjoined from interfering with
persons employed or seeking to be employed as strikebreakers) ; Swift & Co. v. Hague, 2
LAw AND LABOR 9 (N. J. Ch. i919).
25. E. g., In re Reilly, 23 Ohio Nisi Prins (N. s.) 65 (C. P. 919) (Cleveland ordinance
forbidding employment of unlicensed strike guards and giving director of public safety dis-
cretion to grant or withhold such licenses held unconstitutional as violative of right to protect
one's property without interference or hindrance). But cf. State v. Gohl, 46 Wash. 408, 90
Pac. 259 (907) (act making crime of organizing, maintaining and employing an armed body
of men held constitutional as within state's police power).
26. See Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., 96 Fed. 353, 358-368 (C. C. W. D. Ark.
1899).
27. See supra notes 13, 24-26.
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to fail under the correlative limitations imposed on federal action by the Fifth
Amendment. But it is well recognized that the commerce clause is in effect a
limitation on any preconceived property interests when measured by the Fifth
Amendment.2  In only one case"2 has the Supreme Court held federal legisla-
tion, which would otherwise be a valid exercise of the commerce power, invalid
as violative of the due process or liberty clauses.
And it has, of course, long since been held by the Court that "commerce
among the States . . . includes the transportation of persons." 90 Nor should
doubts as to the constitutionality of the present Act be raised by the decisions
which have held that the businesses of providing baseball games 8' and of booking
vaudeville acts 32 in several states are not interstate commerce within the meaning
and purpose of Section 7 of the Shernan Anti-Trust Law,3 3 even though these
businesses necessarily involve the repeated travelling of players from one state
to another. It is important to note that the question of what constitutes inter-
state commerce may have a different answer according as the case concerns the
right of a state to regulate a transaction in the absence of federal legislation
covering the same field,3 4 the right of Congress to regulate the actual business, 5
or the right of Congress to regulate or prohibit the transportation of certain
classes of passengers across state lines.36 The distinction seems clear between
direct regulation of the interstate transportation of persons and regulation of the
business to which such transportation is incidental. On the authority of the
28. GAvr, THE CommERCE CLAUsE (1932) 172. "The power of Congress under the
commerce clause of the Constitution is the ultimate determining question. If the statute be
a valid exercise of that power, how it may affect persons or States is not material to be con-
sidered." McKenna, J., in Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 320 (1913).
And the right of the individual person to go as he pleases among the states is not a right
to be transported for an immoral purpose. Id. at 321. It is conceivable, but not likely, that the
Court may decide that the purpose of using persons to interfere with the right of peaceful
picketing is not sufficiently immoral to modify the right of such persons to go where they
please. One court has said, by way of dictum, that a state cannot keep an undesirable class
of citizens of other states out of its territory merely because they may be expected to breach
the peace. See Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., 96 Fed. 353, 358-368 (C. C. W. D. Ark.
I899).
29. Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 16i (19o8) (act prohibiting interstate carrier
from discharging employee because of membership in labor union held unconstitutional) ; cf.
Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330 (1935). For further analysis of the
relation between the commerce and due process clauses, see Powell, Commerce, Pensiofs and
Codes (I935) 49 HAgv. L. REV. I, 4.
3o. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 320 (1913) (power of Congress to prohibit
transportation of women in interstate commerce for purpose of prostitution or debauchery
upheld).
31. Federal Club v. National League, 259 U. S. 200 (1922) ; see American League Base-
ball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 44r, 459-460, I49 N. Y. Supp. 6, 16-17 (Sup. Ct.
1914) ; cf. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Huhn, i65 Ga. 667, i42 S. E. 121 (1928) (busi-
ness of providing baseball games between clubs in different states held not interstate com-
merce such as would preclude application of state workmen's compensation act to claim for
death of ball player killed while being transported from one game to another).
32. Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 12 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926). Accord:
Metropolitan Opera Co. v. Hammerstein, 162 App. Div. 691, 147 N. Y. Supp. 532 (Ist Dep't,
i914) (producing of grand opera). But cf. Marienelli v. United Booking Offices, 227 Fed.
I65 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
33. 26 STAT. 209 (I890), I5 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7, 15 (1927).
4. E. g., Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U. S. 56o (1915) ; Erie Beach Amuse-
ments v. Spirella Co., 105 Misc. 170, 173 N. Y. Supp. 626 (County Ct 1918).
35. E. g., Federal Club v. National League, 259 U. S. 200 (1922); Hart v. Keith Vaude-
ville Exchange, 12 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
36. E. g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (r913) ; Gooch v. United States, 56 Sup.
Ct 395 (1936) (Federal Kidnaping Act held adequately to express intention of Congress to
prevent transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of persons who were being unlaw-
fully restrained in order that captor might secure some benefit).
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baseball 37 and vaudeville 8s cases, a detective agency in New York may not,
simply by virtue of the fact that in order to break a strike in Chicago it transports
strikebreakers to the latter city as part of its regular business, be itself subject
to federal regulation as engaging in interstate commerce. Yet the strikebreakers
transported as passengers in traffic between states would nevertheless, on the
authority of the White Slave Act decisions,3 9 seem to be subjects of interstate
commerce and hence within the power of Congress to regulate.40
That such regulation may take the form of prohibition is also clear.41 The
basic reason underlying the decisions sustaining prohibitions of interstate trans-
portation 42 seems to be that in each such case the use of interstate commerce
contributed to the accomplishment of harmful results to the people of other
states, and the congressional power over such commerce could be effectively
exercised only by prohibiting it.
4
3
Nor is Congress to be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority over
interstate commerce and of its power to adopt means necessary and convenient
to such exercise merely because those means have the quality of police regula-
tions.44 In fact, such legislation would seem to be justifiable as a supplementary
exercise of the police power by the Federal Government within a field which
the police power of the states may not touch.43
Effect of the Act
However clear the constitutionality of the Act may appear, its probable
ineffectiveness seems even plainer. In view of the prevailing attitude of the
courts in labor disputes,4 6 the terms of the statute seem highly improvident; and
it is a safe prediction that as a result of the lack of pains on the part of the legis-
37. Federal Club v. National League, 259 U. S. 2oo (1922).
38. Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 12 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
39. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913) ; Caninetti v. United States, 242 U. S.
470 (917).
40. Such criminal statutes as the White Slave Traffic Act [36 STAT. 825 (igio), I8 U. S.
C. A. §§ 397-4o4 (927)] and the present one may also be upheld on the theory that Congress
is thereby regulating, not primarily the conduct of the defendant, but the conduct, legal rela-
tionships and interests of the carrier, for the purpose of protecting them. See GAVIT, THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE (932) 92.
41. Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
42. Ibid.; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 22o U. S. 45 (Ig1); Hoke v. United
States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913) ; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917) ; Clark Dis-
tilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U. S. 31 (1917).
43. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 271 (1918). But cf. Whitfield v. Ohio,
297 U. S. 43i (1936), wherein the bounds of this concept are extended to a regulation of inter-
state transportation of convict made goods amounting to a practical prohibition of their im-
portation into states having laws forbidding the sale of such goods, though there is nothing
inherently harmful to the people of other states in such use of interstate commerce. The
ratio decidendi was apparently based simply on the economic detriment involved in requiring
free labor to compete with forced convict labor. See Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the
Supreme Court, z935 Term (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 27, 47.
44. Seven Cases of Eckman's Alterative v. United States, 239 U. S. 5IO (i916) ; Hoke
v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913) ; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 (I9O3).
45. "Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and
punishing the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the
spread of any evil or harm to the people of other States from the State of origin. In doing
this it is merely exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public, within the field of
interstate commerce." Taft, C. J., in Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 436 (1925).
46. See Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts (1932) iO N. C. L. REv. 158;
Mason, Labor and Judical Interpretation (1936) 184 ANNALS 112; Sayre, Labor and the
Courts (1930) 39 YAL.E L. J. 682.
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lators 47 the enforcement of this law will be well nigh impossible. It is not diffi-
cult to forecast the glib innocence with which parties will testify that their only
intent was to use the imported men to fill the places of striking employees or as
guards to protect the strikebreakers of the former class from being harmed by
the strikers-without a thought of employing them to interfere with the "right of
peaceful picketing." 4s
A more gaping hole in the Act is conditioned by a notion prevalent among
many courts that picketing which is peaceful is a rara avis, if not a fantasy beyond
any belief at all.4 9  While this point of view is expressed by only a minority of
the courts,50 even those which do admit the possibility of peaceful picketing and
profess to permit its practice are prone to be thoroughly suspicious of its actuality
in a given case and ready to allow an injunction to issue against all but the most
useless forms of passive persuasion.5 ' If the prohibition imposed by the Act is
to be inapplicable wherever the intent is to employ persons to obstruct "non-
peaceful" rather than "peaceful" picketing, 2 its benefits to labor will prove illu-
sory, indeed.
Moreover, like most statutes which purport to be a boon to the labor unions,
53
the present one depends on the existence of a labor controversy for its applica-
bility.54 The recognition by a court of a "labor controversy affecting wages,
hours, or conditions of labor" within the meaning of this Act is apt to be as
lacking in certainty as the determination of the presence or absence of a strike
for other legal purposes.
55
Even were the Act thoroughly enforceable, however, it would by no means
deal a death blow to the strikebreaking business as an industry on a national scale.
Rather than a serious obstacle to the prolongation of the profession, it would
amount only to an inconvenience which would cause the agencies to make purely
47. Or perhaps to render the Act as completely innocuous as possible was an actual aim,
for its self-nullifying limitations were at least consciously imposed, whether advisedly or only
misguidedly. See H. R. REP. No. 2431, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 2: "The bill is carefully
limited in its terms. The intent to employ the person transported in interstate commerce to
obstruct or interfere with the right of peaceful picketing during a labor controversy is an
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51. E. g., Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, 2 Cal. (2d) 312, 41 P. (2d) 314 (1935) ; Levy &
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"It is extremely doubtful, in short, whether labor organizations can lawfully engage in
any forms of picketing which attract enough public notice to be effective." Cooper, supra
note 5o, at 87.
52. See text of Act, supra note i; Hearings before Subcommittee No. i of Committee
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ment of Senator James F. Byrnes).
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intrastate recruiting their regular policy. Practically every state has an available
supply of the type of men who are potential "scabs" and strike guards, a condition
which has already been made manifest by the fact that in those states whose
non-importation laws are effective the detective agencies still continue to do a
flourishing strikebreaking business. 56
Moreover, the common use of forces of violence other than the imported
bands of the private detective agencies remains untrammeled. The ease with
which almost any number of special deputy sheriffs can be locally commissioned
to act as strike guards is deplorable.5 7  And the ready accessibility, as well as
the efficient brutality, of the state police 58 and even the militia 5" in suppressing
strikes has in some states made them more popular than private detectives with
employers.60 Not the least attractive of the advantages in the use of public or
quasi-public officers is the better than even chance thereby given to the employer
of not being held liable by a court for the tortious conduct of such guards.,'
The ultimate alleviation of the rancor and turbulence which pervade indus-
trial relations in this country will be brought about, if at all, not by throwing
useless sops to labor, but by effecting a fundamental change in the point of view
which at present is an attribute not only of most courts and local government
officials but of the "respectable elements" of society generally. The bitterness
and violence in labor disputes which a smarting sense of injustice engenders will
commence to disappear only when the forces of security cease to be more readily
available to one group than to another and when employees with a grievance or a
demand to enforce can rely on such protection as true equality before the law
should ensure.62
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